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During World War II, the art market experienced a massive boom in occupied 
countries. The discretion, the inflation proof character, the absence of market 
intervention and the possibility to resell artworks abroad have been suggested to 
explain why investing in artworks was one of the most interesting opportunities 
under  the  German  boot.  On  basis  of  an  original  database  of  close  to  4000 
artworks sold between 1944 and 1951 at Giroux, one of the most important Art 
Gallery in Brussels, this paper analyzes, the price movements on the Belgian art 
market following the liberation. Market reactions following the war are used to 
understand  which  motivations  played  the  most  important  role  in  investors’ 
decisions. Prices on the art market experienced a massive drop. This huge price 
decline is attributed to two elements: fear of prosecution for war profits and the 
monetary reforms set into place in October 1944. 
 
JEL Codes: N14, N44, Z11. 
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War, Inflation, Monetary Reforms and the Art 
Market 
 





Art buyers’ motives still remain a controversial topic. Are investment or consumption 
motives at the heart of the buying decisions? A large part of the literature has shown that as an 
investment  artworks  where  most  of  the  time  underperforming  (Baumol,  1986,  Frey  and 
Pommerehne, 1989, or Pesando, 1993). Ginsburgh and Buelens (1992), Goetzmann (1993), Mei 
and Mooses (2002) and Renneboog and Spaenjers (2009) have somehow qualified this result by 
suggesting that art could be an interesting investment if one considered either a given period in 
time  or  some  specific  artistic  schools.  According  to  Campbell  (2005,  2007),  art  is  a  good 
additional  investment  in  a  portfolio  because  it  offers  diversification  benefits.  However 
Renneboog  and  Van  Houtte  (2002)  and  Worhington  and  Higgs  (2004)  found  limited 
diversification potential of art as an investment
1.  
 
Albeit there is not yet only one conclusion about good or bad performances of artworks 
among the literature, some periods seem rather favourable to art investment.  Several authors 
have pointed out a major boom in the Art market of occupied countries during WWII. Moulin 
(1967) describes art as an inflation-hedging investment. Many examples of record sales can be 
given
2 to illustrate high performances of artworks in occupied France. Nicholas (1995) noted that 
Drouot, the main French auction house, experienced its best years during the war period. Drouot 
was not the only auction house succeeding to sell art during the war. Nicholas (1995) argues that 
individual dealers, decorators and purveyors of every stripe were doing just as well as Drouot. 
                                                 
1 Consumption motives have been less investigated. Baumol (1986) considers that the low financial returns may be 
compensated by the “aesthetic dividend” received by art owners. Mandel (2009) analyzes the effects of a utility 
dividend derived from conspicuous art consumption. Goetzmann, Renneboog and Spaenjers (2010) show that art 
booms are more likely to occur whenever income inequality rises quickly. 
2 Seurat’s Le Petit paysan bleu was sold 385.000Ffr. in 1941; C￩zanne’s La montagne Sainte Victoire sold for 
5.000.000Ffr. in 1942; Corot’s Bellevue, vue prise en regardant le Mont Valérien sold for 1.100.000Ffr. in 1943 




Oosterlinck (2011) quantifies the price rise in the art market in occupied France. He constructs a 
price index based on Drouot’s sales between 1940 and 1944. This index experienced a massive 
increase in 1942 and at the beginning of 1943, prices from the end of 1940 being multiplied 
fivefold. The author points out that it could be the consequence of the French “nouveaux riches” 
and of German collectors entering the market. When comparing this art index with other sources 
of investment (Equity, Bond, as well as Gold and Foreign currencies traded on the black market) 
he shows that the returns on the art market where higher than for all other markets from March 
1941 till the Liberation of Paris. Oosterlinck (2011) attributes the remarkable success of the art 
market to a series of factors. Compared to other assets, artworks were relatively discreet and, as 
such  could  help  war  profiteers  to  hide  illicit  war  profits.  Furthermore,  real  assets,  such  as 
artworks provide a hedge against inflation; which was prevalent during the occupation. Artworks 
also benefited from the fact that it was legal to buy them and that market interventions from the 
occupying forces were much less important than on the stock exchange. Eventually, artworks 
were assets which could be transferred and resold abroad should one have to flee. 
 
The situation in occupied France was no exception as the price patterns observed there 
are also to be found in other occupied countries. According to the van Waay’s index, based on 
the sales of the auction house located in Amsterdam, the Dutch art market experienced a boom of 
+2300% between 1940 and 1943 (Eeuwe, 2007). Belgium also experienced a similar situation. 
Newspapers reported the “abundance of sales”, the “firmness of the Art market” and an “intense 
activity”
3. According to the press, auctions reaped “superior to normal”
4 benefits. Comoedia, a 
weekly  art  magazine,  reported  that  “the  art  market  was  lately  characterized  by  an  intense 
activity”. The magazine attributed the success of the Art market to the freshly passed law that 
restricted the detention of monetary assets
5. Some outstanding prices are also worth mentioning
6. 
                                                 
3 L’Echo de la Bourse, March and May 1942. 
4 Id., Ibidem 
5 Comoedia, May 8
th, 1942 
6 In March 1942, « Jeune femme tenant une coupe » of an old Master (Maitre de la Madone au perroquet) was sold 
at 130.000 BEF; « La Sainte famille aux Anges Musiciens » of another Old Master was sold at 95.000BEF. In 
January 1943, “Le pont de Londres” of Emile Courtens was sold at 45.000BEF. In March 1943, Nicolas Pantazis’ 
“Le garcon à la bulle de savon” was sold at 70.000BEF and a Nicolas De Bruyne, “La parabole du riche et du 
pauvre” was sold at 115,000BEF. In May 1943, Frans Courtens “La Ferme de la Haie Sainte à Waterloo” was sold 
at 130.000BEF. (Source: L’Echo de la Bourse, May 1942, January 1943, March 1943 and May 1943). After the 
war, in the Giroux Catalogue, the most expensive Emile Courtens was sold at 10.000BEF, the most expensive 




Elslander (1944, p. 9 and p. 98), a close friend of Georges Giroux, a writer and an art lover 
reported that “Arts, during these years of War, [...] enjoyed an unprecedented craze [...]. Artists 
couldn’t supply the demand of buyers, and even feared a shortage of materials”. He further 
stressed that “during the War period, people were buying a tremendous amount of ugly daubs, 
just because they hoped that one day, maybe, these daubs would reach really high prices”  
 
Even if there is a consensus regarding the art market boom during the Second World War, 
no significant research has investigated what happened just after the liberation. How did the art 
market react once liberation occurred? Where the motivations which had induced people to buy 
artworks  (discretion,  hedge  against  inflation,  legality,  transportability)  still  playing  a  role  in 
liberated  countries?  Or  did  the  end  of  the  occupation  mark  a  dramatic  change  in  buyers’ 
motivations? To answer these question, this paper constructs a new art market index on basis of 
an original database of close to 4000 artworks sold between 1944 and 1951 at Giroux; one of the 
most important Art Gallery in Brussels. To get a sense of the magnitude of the price evolution, 
the art market index is set against the evolution of other sources of investment, such as equity 
and bonds.  
 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: Part 1 presents the Belgian context 
during  and  just  after  the  occupation.  Part  2  presents  the  dataset,  the  methodology  and  the 
expected price pattern. Part 3 provides the results of the investigation, whereas Part 4 concludes.  
 
1. The Belgian context  
 
On May 10
th, 1940 the German troops invaded Belgium. After 18 days of resistance, 
Leopold III, the Belgian king, declared the capitulation of Belgium. From May 28
th, 1940 on, 
Belgium became an occupied country subject to a military administration ruled by the General 
von Falkenhausen (Van den Wijngaert, 1975). One of the main objectives of the occupying forces 
was to make sure that the Belgian economy would be as productive as possible to support the 
German War effort (Van den Wijngaert, 1990). To face German demands, Alexandre Galopin, the 
governor of the Société Générale, the most important Belgian holding at that time, and several 
other important businessmen and bankers constituted the Galopin Committee. This Committee 




Occupation. The Belgian industry kept producing during WWII and an important part of this 
production went to the enemy serving its War effort. It remained unclear to which extent this 
decision could be considered as economic collaboration. Since the War was total, every single 
gram of coal brought to the enemy was helping him in its war effort and could thus be considered 
as collaboration. However, Galopin justified its decision on several grounds. First, the country 
had to create a counter-value to import food, which Belgium did not produce in large enough 
quantities to feed its population. Second, keeping the industries running during the War could 
avoid forced labour and a massive deportation of the workforce to Germany (Van den Wijngaert, 
1990).  Thirdly,  it  could  avoid  a  destruction  of  the  industrial  equipment  of  the  country  and 
consequently facilitate the post-war period.  
 
If the position of the main industrialist was  delicate, the position of the head of the 
administration, the so-called Secrétaires Généraux, was probably even worse. With the ministers 
abroad, the Secrétaires Généraux had to take care of the public administration. One of the key 
elements  to  deal  with  was  the  management  of  public  finance.  Belgium  had  to  pay  huge 
occupation costs and was further plundered by the imposition of a “clearing agreement” with 
Germany.  This  agreement  provided  that  exporters  from  each  country  would  be  paid  with 
advances from their own national bank. The difference between exports and imports would only 
be settled after the war. In view of the respective powers in presence, exports from Germany 
never came close to exports from Belgium, leaving a difference which the state had to finance. 
To finance the war, the state relied on money emission and bond issues. The money supply did 
significantly increase during wartime (Banque Nationale de Belgique, 1945, p. 11). The amount of 
paper and deposit money trebled from 50.610 millions of BEF in May 1940 to 156.457 millions 
of BEF in October 1944 to face the huge occupation indemnities imposed by the occupying 
forces. The short term state debt also increased dramatically during the war. The state ended up 
relying on financial repression to convince investors to hold the bonds (Oosterlinck, 1999, 2010 
and 2011a). Willems and Buelens (2006) detail the exact measures set into to place to render 
equities less attractive. Eventually, investors ended up buying state bonds on a massive scale, not 
because they felt it was a safe investment but rather because of lack of alternative investment 
opportunities  (Oosterlinck,  1999).  Private  individuals  were  indeed  seeking  investment 




the black market. As pointed out by G. Jacquemyns (1950, vol. 2, p. 232) in his study of the 
Belgian Society under German occupation “The little shopkeeper’s most important problem was 
to figure out how to invest its 300.000BEF”. War profits were obviously not well seen by the 
population: “[a lady talking about shopkeepers] They all are vagrants, and lout people. They 
think they won’t have to count  on their  clients  after  the  War.  They are dishonest  and rude 
people”
 (Jacquemyns, 1950, vol. 2, pp. 365-366). Shopkeepers and black market dealers needed 
thus not only an investment protecting their investment from inflation but also a discreet one. For 
these purposes, artworks perfectly did the job. 
 
On  September  3
rd,  the  Allied  forces  liberated  Brussels  from  the  German  occupying 
forces. Since the very beginning of the War Belgian experts  wanted at all cost to avoid the 
disastrous  monetary  situation  which  followed  World  War  I  (Janssens,  1976).  When  the 
Government came back from London, on the 8
th of September 1944, Camille Gutt, the Finance 
Minister had his plan ready to fight inflation. According to Bismans (1992), this plan answered 
three major questions 1) What exchange rates should the Franc Belge adopt?; 2) How should the 
money supply be reduced?; 3) Which fiscal measures should be taken to drive the clean-up of 
public finances? The exchange rate of the Franc Belge was fixed by the government at the value 
of 176BEF to the pound. This rate corresponded to a limited devaluation of the currency. Gutt’s 
plan to address money supply reduction was set up on the 6
th of October 1944. The money 
supply was drastically reduced following these stages: 1) from October 9
th, all 100-and-more-
franc notes lost their legal tender status; 2) from October the 9
th and the 13
th, people could 
convert old notes for an amount equal to 2000BEF per person; 3) bank accounts were totally 
blocked, except for: either 10% of their total value, or their value at the beginning of the War 
(May 9
th, 1940) or up to the limit of 1000BEF per employee for companies; 4) a first money 
liberation (3000BEF) would occur during the first month, and the last money liberation happened 
on January 15
th, 1949; 5) in total, 40% of the total bank accounts value were liberated, and 60% 
declared “Definitely blocked”. These amounts were eventually converted into a “Forced Loan” 
(Baudhuin, 1958, p. 43).  
 
Moreover when the Pierlot government came back from London in September 1944, it 




59). This tax was eventually voted in October 1945 and put into place in January 1946. This tax 
also aimed to find 63 billions of BEF in order to absorb the money Belgium had advanced to the 
enemy via the clearing system (Baudhuin, 1958, p. 58). However it did not succeed as well as 
expected, partly because of the complexity of the tax. It included three measures: a 5%-tax on 
every capital (as established at the end of the War), a 95%-tax on the special war benefits and a 
100%-tax  on  the  transactions  with  the  enemy.  The  5%-tax  concerned  every  citizen  but 
exemptions were stipulated (50.000BEF per person) that narrowed the scope of this tax. The set 
up of the 95%-tax faced two problems: first of all, it was necessary to establish the wealth of a 
private individual in  1939 in  order to  evaluate the difference after the  War. Second  the tax 
applied to securities prices of the summer of 1944. These securities prices were much higher than 
when the stock exchanges reopened a few months later. The third tax applied to legal operations 
and deals concluded with the enemy.   
 
After  the  war,  industrialists  as  well  as  people  who  had  managed  to  earn  substantial 
amounts of money during the war began fearing accusations of economic collaboration. In this 
respect,  the  law  was  crystal  clear:  any  form  of  economic  collaboration  was  illegal.  The 
arguments at the basis of the Galopin doctrine were deemed as not founded during the first 
months following the liberation of Brussels (Luyten, 1996, p. 31). The main prosecutor, Walter 
Ganshof van der Meersch, had a broad interpretation regarding what constituted or not weapons 
or ammunitions (Luyten, 1996, pp. 34-35) For the early cases (between November 1944 and 
May 1945), defences based on the Galopin doctrine well not well received (Luyten, 1996, p. 37). 
Political elements lead to a modification of the law on May 25
th, 1945. This new law gave some 
breathing space to people fearing prosecution as it limited the spectrum of deliveries which had 
to  be  considered  as  weapons  or  ammunition  (Van  den  Wijngaert,  1990,  p.  126).  Most 
entrepreneurs had continued working during the War, but the population only blamed the ones 
who had explicitly worked with the enemy and who had made profits with them. Also small 
innkeepers and black market dealers suffered the wrath of the angry population. However the 
heavy phase of attacks gradually faded out after May 1945. As a whole, even though Galopin’s 
decision was deeply criticized, economic collaboration was far less repressed after the War than 





2. Data and methodology    
 
The  data  series  used  in  this  paper  have  been  collected  from  one  catalogue  (Galerie 
Georges Giroux, 1951)
7. The Galerie Georges Giroux was a well-established art gallery. Georges 
Giroux  started its  gallery  in  1912.  Georges  Giroux  was  the first  to organize  a  collective 
exhibition of some famous-to-be artists, “Les fauvistes braban￧ons” (Paelmer, 2004). Moreover 
he contractualized, and was the first in doing so, its relationship with the artists, such as Rik 
Wouters, he was sponsoring (Paelmer, 2004). This was markedly new for Belgian artists who, at 
that time, were often struggling to live from their art
 (Elslander, 1954). Even though the Galerie 
Giroux represented only a fraction of the art market, we believe, in view of its importance at the 
time, that it was representative of the overall art market in Belgium. 
 
The catalogue used here tracks all paintings, drawings, etchings, sculptures sold at Giroux 
between December 1944 and May 1951. Unfortunately during the war years gallery was closed 
and there is therefore no available data for this period
8. The catalogue provides a description of 
the medium used the size of the artwork and in some cases, the dates of birth and death of the 
artist and his school. Artworks are classified by artist, in alphabetical order. The date of auction 
is  most  of  the  time  given.  The  catalogue  also  records  auction  sales  of  gold   works  and 
silverwares. For consistency reasons, this second part has not been taken into account. In some 
cases, the date of sale, the price or the size are not mentioned. Once excluded, the sample 
contains 5390 artworks. The description of the artworks in the catalogue can be itself categorized 
into  seven  categories:  Cardboard  artworks  (Cardboard,  Paper,  Mounted  paper),  Wooden 
artworks, Drawings (Drawing, Dessin réhaussé, Charcoal, Red chalk drawing, Sepia), Oil on 
canvas (Oil on canvas, oil mounted on ca nvas), Watercolor (Wash drawing, Gouache, Pastel), 
Engravings (Eaux-fortes réhaussée, Etchings, Etchings in color, Engravings in color, Lithograph, 
Lithograph in color, Monotypes, Phototypes) and Sculptures. Appendix I provides the proportion 
of each of these categories. The proportion of cardboards remained constant during the postwar 
period  (5%).  Wood  experienced  a  sharp  increase  during  1945 -1946  (from  19%  to  28%), 
                                                 
7 Galerie Georges Giroux, (1951), Répertoire des prix atteints par les tableaux, aquarelles, gouaches, dessins, eaux-
fortes, sculptures ayant passé en vente à la Galerie Georges Giroux de décembre 1944 à mai 1951 et comprenant 
plus de sept mille numéros répartis dans soixante-dix ventes publiques, suivi d’un r￩pertoire des prix atteints par 
l’orf￨vrerie ancienne pendant la m￪me p￩riode, (Bruxelles), Éditions de la Galerie Georges Giroux, 92p.   
8 One of the main competitors, the Galerie Moderne remained open during the war but unfortunately there is no 




Canvasses a sharp decrease during 1949-1950 (from 43% to 33%). The proportion of drawings 
sold remained constant (around 10%) except in 1945-1946 where it experienced a sharp decrease 
(4%). Watercolors were very well sold during 1944-1945 and 1948-1949 (18 and 15% versus an 
average of 11%). Engravings represented a proportion (in average) of 6% but experienced a 
sharp rise in 1949-1950 (26%). This can be explained by the fact that all of Ensor’s etchings 
were sold that year in Giroux. Proportion of sculptures sold remained around 2%.   
 
Another indicator of the activity at Giroux can be given by the total sales per year and by 
the number of works sold per year. Table 1 provides these figures. In 1945-1946, total sales 
experienced a slight increase. Then total sales decreased until 1948-1949 where they encountered 
a sharp increase until 1949-1950. They decreased again in 1950-1951. Moreover, the number of 
works  sold  followed  the  trend  of  the  sales  except  for  1946-1947  and  1948-1949  where  it 
followed the opposite move of the sales.  
 
Table  1:  Number  of  paintings,  drawings,  watercolours,  engravings  and  sculptures  and  total 
amount of sales from 1944 to 1951 
   1944-1945  1945-1946  1946-1947  1947-1948  1948-1949  1949-1950  1950-1951 
Total Sales 
per year 





3,591,710  3,747,578  2,443,018  2,006,843  2,605,725  3,612,098  3,118,059 
Number of 
works sold 
674  825  877  693  591  1013  725 
 
 The art market is a very specific market. Benefits may only be reaped by prices increases 
since there are no dividends. Even though it tends to become more and more a mass market it is 
still an opaque one where prices are often not disclosed. Gérard-Varet (1995) highlights the 
heterogeneous characteristic of artworks: objects of art are produced as differentiated object and 
are not substitutable one to another. To deal with the particularities of the art market economists 
rely mainly on two different approaches: the repeated-sales regression and the hedonic regression 
methods.  The repeat-sales regression method uses  prices of individual  objects  traded at  two 
                                                 
9  Base  year  1945.  Source:  Cassiers  I.,  Scholliers  P.,  (1994),  Le  pacte  social  belge  de  1944,  les  salaires  et  la 




distinct moments in time
10. In view of the limited number of repeated sales observed during our 
period, the analysis relies on the hedonic regression . In hedonic regressions (HR), the price is 
regressed on various attributes of the objects. These attributes are the characteristics of the asset. 
This allows controlling for quality changes by attributing implicit prices to the value -adding 
characteristics
11. A time dummy captures the pure time-effect and is used to compute the price 
index.  
 
Typically, a HR model takes the following form: 
ln pkt = ∑    
    mXmkt + ∑    
    t δkt + ∑ ∑    
   
 
    jt ωkjt + εkt 
where pkt is the price of good k at time t, Xmkt is the value of the time-invariant characteristic m of 
artwork k at time t, δkt is a time dummy variable which takes one if the artwork k is sold on t and 
zero otherwise and ωkjt is the value of the time-variant characteristic j of artwork k at time t. The 
antilogs of the βt coefficients are then used to construct the hedonic price index.  
 
The key issue when using HR is the specification of the model. Since the price index is 
constructed on the coefficients of the time-dummies omissions of variables will alter the results. 
Ginsburgh, Mei and Moses (2006) summarized the main characteristics to be taken into account 
as dimensions (height, width), medium (oil, collage, pastel, drawing, mixed media, …), support 
(canvas, wood panel, Cardboard, paper), signature dummy and a dated dummy. Artist dummy 
and a dummy  capturing  the fact  that  the  artist  was  dead  at  time of the sale are  also  really 
common  variables  (Renneboog  and  Spaenjers  (2009)).  Czujack  (1997)  focusing  on  Picasso 
paintings added a dummy stating the presence of the artwork in the Catalogue Raisonné Zervos 
in which most of Picasso’s works are registered. This registration is considered to be a proof of 
authenticity and assumed to influence prices. Several other dummies were added in this paper: an 
Exhibition-dummy (that takes the value one if works have been exhibited), a Resale-dummy 
(takes the value one if the work has been resold) and a Gallery-dummy (to assess if there is a 
premium depending of the gallery the artwork is sold in). A Period-dummy was also added in 
order to assess if Picasso’s periods (Blue, Rose) influenced prices. A Pre-Sale Estimate variable 
was  added  too  to  see  whether  this  estimate  has  an  influence  on  the  final  hammer  price. 
                                                 
10 See for example: Anderson (1974) Baumol (1986). Pesando (1993) Goetzmann (1993). 





Renneboog and Spaenjers (2009) added a Reputation-dummy such as the number of words used 
to describe the artist in Grove Art Online, a dummy taking the value one if the artist is mentioned 
in  Gardner text  book (a classic art history text book), a Documenta Exhibition dummy that 
captures the fact that the artist has or has not been represented in the prestigious Documenta 
exhibition in Kassel.   
 
To perform the regression the sample of observations has been restricted. Sculptures were 
excluded from the sample because of the limited number of sales (2.68% of the database) and the 
lack of information on their characteristics. Since their size was not mentioned engravings
12 were 
also  excluded.  The catalogue description of artworks may be classified into five categories: 
Cardboard artworks (Cardboard, Paper, Mounted paper), Wooden artworks, Drawings (Drawing, 
Dessin réhaussé, Charcoal, Red chalk drawing, Sepia), Oil on canvas (Oil on canvas, oil 
mounted  on  canvas)  and  Watercolour  (Wash  drawing,  Gouache,  Pastel).  Some  of  the 
specifications provided in the catalogue (Paintings on glass a nd posters) were too specific (less 
than 5 artworks) to be included in the sample.  Furthermore on three dates sales only concerned 
one or two artworks and were th us deleted from the database. Eventually our sample contains 
3917 artworks from 557 different artists.  
 
The following variables were used for the regression: 
 
The dependant variable is the logarithm of the price as mentioned in the catalogue
13.  
 
Artist Dummies: take one if the artwork has been created by the artist in question, zero otherwise.  
 
Date Dummies: take one if the artwork is sold at the date in question, zero otherwise. Appendix 
II exhibits the dates of sales and the number of artworks sold at this date. Sales of the same 
month were grouped together. Two remaining dates contain less than 15 artworks.  
 
                                                 
12 Engravings include: etchings, etchings in colour, engravings in colour, lithograph, lithograph in colour, monotype, 
eau-forte réhaussée, phototype. For these media, size is not mentioned.  
13 Transaction costs were not taken into account since the catalogue specifies that they remained constant on the 




Size: Height and Width (measured in cm) as well as the works’ surface (in cm
2) capture the 
impact of the object size. The size does not include the frame.  
 
Deceased Dummy: Takes one if the artist was dead at the time of the sale.  
 
Topic  Dummies:  We  use  the  methodology  of  Renneboog  and  Spaenjers  (2009)  to  define 
artworks’ topics. We categorize the artworks on basis of words from the titles. Since our sample 
is more limited than theirs we check whether the word makes sense for a given painting. We 
distinguish the following categories: Animals, Landscape, Still life, People, Portrait, Urban. The 
associated search strings are listed in Appendix III. 
 
Medium Dummies: These dummies are Cardboard, Canvas, Wooden artworks, Watercolors and 
Drawings.  Although  this  represents  a  mix  between  supports  and  Media,  we  stick  to  this 
specification since it is the one used in the catalogue.  
 
The construction of the index should provide us with first insights regarding the fate of 
the art market in the aftermath of Brussels’ liberation. To precisely identify which elements may 
explain the price evolution on the art market, we develop a four-step approach in. We first try ex 
ante to identify elements which could play a role and their expected impact on the art market. 
We then set into perspective major price changes with the dating of these elements. Once this is 
done, we try to  assess on basis of contemporaneous accounts whether  changes in supply or 
demand may explain the changes. Eventually, we compare reactions on the art market with price 
changes on other markets (bonds and equity). 
 
Several reactions could have been expected on the art market. Table 2 lists reasons which 
could have affected the art market and their expected impact on supply and demand. If artworks 
were bought during the war because it was perceived as a good way to hide war profits then two 
reactions may be expected at the Liberation. On the one hand, owners of these artworks may 
have  wished  to  sell  these  as  soon  as  possible  to  prevent  scrutiny.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
prosecution was high on the agenda at the time, keeping the artworks hidden might also have 




supply side, even though it is hard to determine in which direction. The monetary reform could 
also explain patterns in price changes. The Plan Gutt aimed at cleaning-up the money overhang 
in a fashion close to financial repression
14. The monetary reform of October 1944 brought a 
drastic cut in liquidity supply. Following the Plan Gutt, the money supply was only allowed to 
grow gradually. Appendix V shows the evolution of the money supply between 1944 and 1948 
and details its evolution for 1946 and 1947.  Changes in the supply were most of the time very 
limited and for some months even negative. This situation led to a scramble for cash among the 
population during the whole period of 1944 to 1947 . On the supply side, if owner of artworks 
were desperate to get cash, as was the case of a large part of the population at the time, they may 
have wished to sell their artwork s. This would have had a positive impact on the  supply of 
artworks. Regarding the demand side, the monetary reforms could have had a negative impact: 
low level of money would have made it harder for buyers to acquire artworks.   If investors held 
artworks because of this investment’s interesting characteristics in wartime, one would expect 
investors, once the war was over, to rebalance their portfolio: that is to sell artworks to invest in 
traditional assets such as equities. This would have a positive impact on the supply side, and at 
the same time increase the demand for equity.  
 
Table 2: Reasons which could have affected the art market and their expected impact on supply 
and demand 
 
In view of the elements listed in Table 2, one should expect a large price drop following the war. 
On the supply side many elements tend to indicate an increase in supply, whereas every factor 
playing on the demand side seems to have a negative impact.  
                                                 
14 This kind of approach has been common for a long-time (Reinhart, Sbrancia, 2011). 
  Supply  Demand 
Prosecution of economic 
collaborators 
Positive: if willingness to sell before 
getting caught  
Negative: it makes sense to keep on 
hiding 
 
Monetary Reform  Positive: if willingness to sell and 
scramble for cash 
Negative: potential buyers stick to 
their cash 
Rebalancing investments  Positive: willingness to sell 
Should lead to an increase in investment 






3. Results  
 
Appendix  V  summarizes  the  results  of  the  regression  and  our  baseline  model.  All 
dummies are included but deceased which had to be removed because of colinearity issues. The 
adjusted R-square of the model is slightly above 73% and is consistent with the literature (see for 
instance  Renneboog  and  Spaenjers,  2009).  Price  is  a  concave  function  of  the  size.  In  this 
specification  Watercolor  is  not  significant.  Oil  and  Wooden  artworks  sell  at  a  premium  in 
comparison to the excluded variable (Cardboard). Artworks representing Urban scenes perform 
greatly,  bearing  a  positive  sign.  Signs  of  Portraits  and  of  Landscapes  are  negative  in  this 
specification. 
 
The antilogs of the coefficients of the time dummies allow us to construct a price index. 
The model used to build our index is the baseline model. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the art 
index which may be divided into two significant periods.  
 




The first period starts in December 1944 and ends in October 1947. During this period the 
market experienced a massive crash; falling from a value of 400 to 41.08 in just three years. This 
                                                 
15 The index is in real terms and has been corrected by a retail index created by Baudhuin F., “Prix, consommation et 















general trend allows us to conclude that the boom the market encountered during the War was 
not sustained  after the  liberation.  “Your  money will keep all its  value”  was  the pitch of an 
advertisement for a Belgian gallery on March 10
th, 1945
16, our analysis shows how far from the 
reality this assertion was. After October 1947, the index oscillates between 41 and 85. However 
no clear trend emerges during this period, the market showing very volatile movements . From 
October 1947 to February 1948 the index is increasing, reaching the value of 98.40. The October 
1948 – May 1949 period is impacted by a major increase from October 1948 to November 1948 
(46.43 to 96.77). From January 1950 to February 1950, the art index increased sharply again 
(40.04 to 85). Between October 1950 and April 1951, the index decreased from 79.39 to 62.98 
(reaching a bottom value of 47.28 in February 1951).   
 
To determine the respective role of each of the previously mentioned factors which could 
have played a role on artworks prices, we first look at the timing of the price changes. The most 
dramatic price decline occurred between February and May 1945, suggesting that events which 
took place during this time period played a preeminent role.  
 
First of all, the fear of prosecution for economic collaboration would fit perfectly well in 
terms of timing. Indeed, up till May 1945 the prosecution took a very hard stance in this respect. 
Luyten (2008) assesses that there were two periods during which public reactions against these 
collaborators were more important. The first one happened right after the Liberation. We have 
unfortunately no information about it in our art index. The second period of strong repression 
took place during the spring of 1945. Dealers and small shopkeepers who took advantage of the 
occupation might have been scared of these repressions. In the absence of data on the proportion 
of artworks which were proposed at auction but did not find a buyer (bought-in artworks), it is 
particularly hard to determine the state of supply and demand. To be sure, sales volumes at the 
Giroux Gallery, reported in Figure 2, show an increase in the volumes on the three first years. 
Furthermore, the number of artworks sold at auctions increased between February 1945 (128 
sales) and May 1945 (164 sales)
17. Even if the increase in supply was relatively limited, it seems 
to indicate that people were willing to get rid of their artworks.  
                                                 
16 L’Echo de la Bourse (March 9 and 10
th, 1945),  Advertisement for the “Galerie Ath￩na” 









The demand on the market might on the other hand have been very little. Indeed, the 
monetary reform which occurred in October 1944 brought a drastic cut in liquidity supply. The 
first weeks of 1945 are characterized by a reduction of the money supply
18. Belgium is still 
helping the Allies to fight the Nazis and has to encourage their war effort. In March 1945, the 
war is not yet over for Belgium and people still fear a German attack. The conjunction of these 
two factors points out that the demand was probably low.  In an article dated, October 13 -14
th 
1944, a journalist from l’Echo de la Bourse indicated that following the monetary reforms, the 
activity on the art market had been inexistent
19. He further feared that it would not be possible to 
conduct the few announced sales as planned
20. This suggests that there were no buyers on the 
market. The combination of an increasing supply and probably a low demand might have led the 
prices to the dramatic crash we know.  
 
The impacts of the monetary reform are not limited to 1945. The liberation of money 
occurred very slowly. In 1946 and 1947, the amount of liquidities in the economy  was very 
unstable. The expansion of the money supply was even negative on some months. The value of 
                                                 
18 Rapport de la Banque Nationale de Belgique, 1945 
19 "Par suite des récentes mesures monétaires, l'activité sur le marché de l'art a été absolument nulle pendant ces 
derniers jours », L'Echo de la Bourse, 13-14th October 1944. 
20 « il semble même problématique que les rares ventes qui ont été annoncées puissent avoir un découlement 
normal. », L'Echo de la Bourse, 13-14th October 1944. 
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our art index decreases by close to 50% between April and May 1946 and between December 
1946 and March 1947. Both these periods correspond to a reduction of the paper money supply 
in the economy
21, which might have led to a feeling of money scarcity among the population. In 
its 1947 report, the National Bank attributed the weakness of the stock markets by the scarcity of 
money.  Individuals as  well as  large  corporations  were keeping cash  to reconstitute liquid 
reserves. The slow liberation of money on the market explains the joint movement between the 
art and the Equity indices (see below). 
 
To rule out alternative explanations, we analyze whether the price decrease might not be 
attributed to investors rebalancing their portfolios . If indeed buyers were holding artworks for 
investment purposes and because of the characteristics of arts’ investment during the war, then 
the war’s end should lead them to rebalance their portfolio. In a sense, the war’s end may be 
viewed as a natural experiment allowing discriminating the motives of art buyers. This approach 
has been used by Kang and Rockoff (2006) to determine whether American investors bought 
bonds for patriotic reasons during the First World War. For comparison’s sake, Figure 3 plots the 
art index, an equity index and a bond index
22. The comparison starts in June 1945 since the Stock 
Exchange remained closed until June 4
th 1945. All indices are normalized at 100 in June 1945.  
 
                                                 
21 See Appendix IV 
22 Share Index: Buelens (2006); Bonds Index: Belgian Treasury Bonds (issued in August 1944; 10 years) (Data 




Figure 3: Price Evolution of the three Indices (since June 1945 for Stocks and Bonds; All in real 
terms) 
 
Sources: Buelens (2003 and 2006) for Equity Index; L’Echo de la Bourse (1945-1951) for the 
Bond Index.  
 
The art index and the equity Index follow the same trend on the first period identified in 
the  previous  paragraph.  From  June  1945  until  October  1947,  both  indices  decreased 
significantly. During the first months of 1948, the equity index increased sharply. This increase 
was due to rumours about a possible revaluation of Gold and an alignment of the currencies. The 
equity index remains then stable until September 1949 and then started to slightly increase. The 
art index seems less stable and reaches a peak in February 1950. This chart highlights a strong 
correlation between Art and stocks on the first period considered. On some periods (September 
to December 1945 and October 1946 to March 1947) the indices even seem perfectly correlated. 
One might ask whether this correlation would possibly result of an influence of one market on 
the other. Chanel (1995) and Ginsburgh and Jeanfils (1995) found evidence of a short run impact 
of  stock  markets  on  the  art  market.  Chanel  (1995)  found  evidence  of  a  one  year-lagged 
relationship of stock markets on the art market and explained it by the size difference between 
both markets. Figure 3 shows that both indices are varying simultaneously. Consequently it is 















follow a similar trend, this would tend to indicate that investors did not resell their artworks to 
invest in equities. Investors did not rebalance their portfolios with Bonds because the index does 




During the Second World War, the Art market experienced a massive boom in occupied 
countries. The lack of other sources of investments and the increase in the money supply played 
an  important  role  in  this  evolution.  During  the  war  artworks  presented  unique  investment 
characteristics. They were inflation proof, it was legal to buy them and their market was not 
directly controlled by the occupation forces. Furthermore artworks could be resold abroad if one 
had  to  leave  the  country.  Last  but  not  least,  artworks  were  a  particularly  discreet  form  of 
investment.  
 
The performances of the Art market from December 1944 to April 1951 in Belgium is 
measured by constructing an artworks price index for the considered period. It shows that the 
market faced a massive crash from December 1944 to October 1947. The crash experienced by 
the  art  market  was  mostly  due  to  two  elements:  the  fear  of  prosecution  for  economic 
collaboration and the monetary reforms of October 1944. The first element reduced the supply of 
artworks. War profiteers who had invested in artworks to hide their illegal profits refrained from 
selling  any  artwork  as  long  as  the  prosecution  was  taking  a  very  hard  stance  on  economic 
collaboration (from September 1944 to May 1945). Monetary reforms played an even bigger role 
since only an even larger reduction in demand could account for the observed price decline if 
supply was reduced. Following the freeze of bank accounts, the main concern for the population 
became to manage to get cash for food not for paintings. 
 
Most empirical studies show that investing in artworks leads to poor returns in view of 
the risk taken. Research on occupied countries during the Second World War have however 
shown artworks to outperform traditional investment and even investments in illegal goods (gold 
or foreign currencies) traded on the black market. Only analyses focusing on the immediate 




of data from a leading Belgian gallery, this paper shows that the liberation marked an end to the 
art  market  boom.  Following  the  liberation,  the  art  market  lost  some  of  the  appealing 
characteristics  that  had  made  it  a  very  popular  investment  during  the  Second  World  War. 
Shopkeepers and smugglers which had invested in artworks to hide illegal profits made during 
the war, preferred to remain quiet at the Liberation. Monetary reforms, needed to purge the 
money overhang, dealt a severe blow to the art market. By contracting the monetary base in an 




APPENDIX I: Descriptive statistics  
 















Cardboard  7%  4%  5%  5%  6%  4%  4% 
Wood  19%  28%  22%  19%  19%  13%  15% 
Canvas  42%  43%  46%  43%  43%  33%  45% 
Drawing  7%  4%  8%  12%  9%  8%  13% 
Watercolor  18%  12%  11%  10%  15%  12%  11% 
Engravings  6%  7%  4%  8%  5%  26%  11% 
Sculptures  2%  2%  5%  2%  3%  4%  1% 
 















Cardboard  6%  1%  5%  2%  2%  8%  4% 
Wood  19%  32%  19%  14%  15%  10%  14% 
Canvas  58%  57%  66%  74%  69%  62%  72% 
Drawing  5%  1%  2%  3%  3%  3%  2% 
Watercolor  10%  4%  4%  4%  7%  7%  6% 
Engravings  1%  1%  1%  1%  0%  5%  1% 
Sculptures  2%  2%  3%  2%  4%  6%  1% 
 
Table 3: Total sales (BEF) per year and number of artworks sold per year 
   1944-1945  1945-1946  1946-1947  1947-1948  1948-1949  1949-1950  1950-1951 
Total Sales 
per year 
3,591,710  3,936,625  2,644,735  1,899,525  2,541,120  3,561,790  2,801,505 
Total Sales 
per year real 
terms
23 
3,591,710  3,747,578  2,443,018  2,006,843  2,605,725  3,612,098  3,118,059 
Number of 
works sold 









                                                 
23 Base year 1945. Source: Cassiers I., Scholliers P., (1994),  Le pacte social belge de 1944, les salaires et la 






Table 4: Average price (BEF) per year per medium  














Cardboard  4,231  1,546  3,006  1,350  1,667  6,933  3,292 
Wood  5,555  5,449  2,655  2,025  3,351  2,798  3,648 
Canvas  7,367  6,425  4,302  4,678  6,940  6,622  6,094 
Drawing  3,626  1,335  820  661  1,259  1,164  750 
Watercolor  2,975  1,707  1,071  1,083  1,900  1,990  2,217 
Engravings  495  869  519  205  192  642  230 
Sculptures  4,295  5,163  1,929  2,427  6,237  5,609  6,030 
 
Table 5: Most expensive artworks sold  
1  Ensor James  Les poissardes mélancoliques  Toile  400,000 
2  De Braekeleer 
Henri 
Le savetier  Bois   240,000 
3  Stevens Alfred  La visite  Toile   210,000 
4  Boulenger 
Hippolyte 
L'aube (le labour)   Toile   200,000 
5  Renoir Auguste  L'épaule nue  Toile   200,000 
6  Laermans 
Eugène 
Le soir  Toile   170,000 
7  Ensor James  Poissons et coquillages  Toile  160,000 
8  Boulenger 
Hippolyte 
Le retour à la ferme  Toile    155,000 
9  Utrillo Maurice  Derrière la maison de Mimi Pinson  Carton  150,000 
10  Matisse Henri  Collioures   Toile   150,000 
11  De Braekeleer 
Henri 
La couturière  Toile   145,000 
12  Utrillo Maurice  Le plant de vignes  Toile   135,000 
13  Evenepoel Henri  Le petit Charles au berceau  Toile   130,000 
14  Evenepoel Henri  La foire des invalides, le dimanche  Toile   120,000 
15  Laermans 
Eugène 
Les réprouvés  Toile   110,000 
16  Wouters Rik  Par la fenêtre (Boitsfort)  Toile   100,000 
17  Stobbaerts Jan  La porte verte  Toile   100,000 
18  Edouard Manet   Le grand-duc  Toile   100,000 
19  Leys Henri  Les femmes catholiques  Bois   90,000 








Table 6: Most sold artists  
   
1  Ensor James  181 
2  De Bruycker Jules  88 
3  Smits Jakob  73 
4  Rops Félicien  73 
5  Verheyden Isidore  60 
6  Thevenet Louis  57 
7  Permeke Constant  51 
8  Madou Jean-Baptiste  49 
9  Frederic Léon  49 
10  Courtens Frans  48 
11  De Braekeleer Henri  48 
12  Laermans Eugène  47 
13  Meunier Constantin  47 
14  Boulenger Hippolyte  46 
15  Baron Théodore  46 
16  Heymans Adrien-Joseph  45 
17  Wouters Rik  44 
18  Vogels Guillaume   43 
19  Smits Eugène  43 




APPENDIX II: Dates of sales and number of artworks sold  
Date of sale  # of artworks sold  
déc-44  13 
févr-45  128 
mars-45  171 
mai-45  164 
juil-45  71 
sept-45  59 
oct-45  31 
déc-45  211 
févr-46  99 
avr-46  118 
mai-46  99 
oct-46  142 
déc-46  152 
janv-47  73 
mars-47  152 
avr-47  147 
oct-47  150 
nov-47  132 
févr-48  112 
avr-48  105 
oct-48  131 
nov-48  127 
févr-49  43 
mars-49  80 
avr-49  43 
mai-49  32 
juin-49  7 
sept-49  61 
nov-49  23 
déc-49  20 
janv-50  20 
févr-50  37 
mars-50  255 
avr-50  65 
mai-50  57 
juin-50  51 
oct-50  120 
déc-50  130 
févr-51  174 
avr-51  112 




Appendix III: Topics dummies search strings  
ANIMALS: « chat»; « homard»; « Mouton»; « taureau »; «Ane »; «Animaux»; «basse-cour»; 
ﾫB￩tail ﾻ; ﾫboaﾻ;  ﾫbœuf ﾻ; ﾫ lionﾻ; ﾫcanardﾻ; ﾫCanicheﾻ; ﾫChatsﾻ; ﾫCheval ﾻ; ﾫChevaux ﾻ; 
«chèvre »; «chien»; «Coqs »; «Coquillages»; «corbeaux »; «épagneul»; «étalon »; «Huitres»; 
«lévrier  »;  «lièvre»;  «mulets»;  «Oies  »;  «ours»;  «Pigeons»;  «Poisson»;  «poulain»;  «singe»; 
«Vache» 
 
LANDSCAPE: «paysage»; «marine»; «étang»; «rivière»; «mer»; «cascade»; «lac»; «clairière»; 
«pâturage»;  «Polders»;  «Provence»;  «côte»;  «forêt»;  «bois»;  «champ»;  «verger»;  «dune»; 
«plage»; «rivière»; «ruisseau»; «torrent»; «Dyle»; «Escaut»; «Alpes»; «Apennins»; «rochers»; 
«sous-bois»  
 
PEOPLE : «Accoudée»; «Acteur»; «Artiste»; «Baigneuse»; «Blessé»; «Bohémienne»; «Belles 
de»;  «Cavalier»;  «Capitaine»;  «Clochard»;  «Commères»;  «Endormie»;  «Enfant»;  «Femme»; 
«Fillette»; «Grenadier»; «Hiercheuse»; «Homme»; «Fille»; «Garçon»; «Dame»; «Couturière»; 
«Glaneuse»; «Mère»; «Marchand»; «Métisse»; «Peintre»; «Paysan»; «Pêcheur» 
 
PORTRAIT : «portrait» and named people  
 
STILL_LIFE : «Nature morte»; «Fleurs et fruits» and classification of the catalogue 
 
URBAN :  «Avignon»;  «Marken»;  «Tanger»;  «Venise»;  «Alexandrie»;  «Amsterdam»; 
«Anseremme»; «Béguinage»;  «Avenue»; «Rue»; «Boulevard»; «Marché»; «Ruelle»; «Bruges»; 
«Malines»; «Gand»; «Anvers»; «Beffroi»; «Cathédrale»; «Eglise»; «Port»; «Bruxelles»; «Ville»; 
«Foire»; «Namur»; «Paris»; «Palais»; «Pont»; «Quai»; «Toit» 
 
 




APPENDIX IV : Money supply evolution 
Evolution of monetary supply (in Billions of BEF) 
         Monnaie 
du 
Trésor 









1936-1938  1.6  22  3.7  2.9  12.8  43 
May 1940  1.6  29.8  0.9  4.7  13.5  50.5 
October 6
th, 1944  6.4  100.9  3.6  11  42.7  164.6 
Monetary Reform 
October 1944 
6.4  25.3  3.6  6.7  15.4  57.4 
End 1944  6.3  38.8  3.8  10.7  14.6  74.2 
End 1945  6.8  69.9  3.5  16.5  34.8  131.5 
End 1946  5.5  72.2  6.3  18.3  43.3  145.6 
End 1947  4.4  78.3  5.9  20.2  42.5  151.3 
June 1948  4.5  78.6  7.1  19.2  38.1  147.5 
Source: Janssens V., Le franc belge, Un siècle et demi d'histoire monétaire 
 
 














Evolution of the money supply 
(1947) 
















Banks  Total 
January  73,858  5,480  79,338  5,376  22,887  44,225  151,826 
February  74,417  5,273  79,690  5,109  21,651  46,786  158,236 
March  75,848  5,101  80,449  5,241  20,186  44,773  150,650 
April  75,793  4,738  80,531  4,806  21,504  44,061  150,902 
May  76,249  4,755  80,998  4,611  21,323  44,461  151,394 
June  76,555  4,553  81,108  4,199  21,034  44,519  150,860 
July  76,711  4,475  81,186  4,179  22,088  45,093  152,646 
August  78,228  4,440  82,668  4,132  22,181  45,452  154,434 
September  79,185  4,392  83,577  3,928  21,119  44,943  153,567 
October  79,750  4,384  84,134  3,874  22,960  45,875  156,843 
November  79,588  4,338  83,926  4,011  22,328  47,264  157,529 
December  78,891  4,349  83,240  4,375  21,637  45,803  155,055 
            Source : Rapport BNB 1947 
Evolution of the money supply 
(1946) 
















Banks  Total 
January  71,975  6,840  78,815  3,120  17,716  35,137  134,797 
February  73,062  6,768  79,830  3,152  20,826  36,027  139,835 
March  73,570  6,683  80,253  2,910  21,420  36,233  140,825 
April  73,673  6,568  80,241  3,200  18,503  36,767  138,711 
May  73,122  6,452  79,574  3,153  21,096  38,369  142,192 
June  73,226  6,475  79,701  2,859  18,740  39,350  140,650 
July  73,205  6,298  79,503  4,330  20,597  39,777  144,236 
August  72,480  6,290  78,770  4,498  20,122  39,917  143,307 
September  72,254  6,306  78,560  4,990  19,266  40,942  143,758 
October  72,273  6,207  78,480  4,797  20,397  41,716  145,390 
November  72,382  6,102  78,484  4,954  20,540  43,337  147,315 
December  72,502  5,856  78,358  5,868  21,183  43,895  149,304 
         




APPENDIX V: Table Results of hedonic regression 
The model is estimated using OLS. The dependant variable is the natural logarithm of the prices (in real 
terms). The model is estimated using heteroskedasticity consistent errors (White’s errors).  
 
 
Variables  Model 
Monthly Dum.  Incl.
24  
Artist Dum.   Incl.
25 
Deceased  Not incl.  
Height  0.021387*** 
Width  0.019937*** 
Height²  -0.0001*** 
Width²  -4.60E-05*** 
Cardboard  Omitted for colinearity 
Wood  0.561365*** 
Canvas  0.428779*** 
Drawing  -0.83807*** 
Watercolor  -0.11418 
Landscape  -0.06438** 
People  0.051579 
Portrait   -0.28178** 
Still-Life  0.212806 
Urban   0.050489*** 













   
                                                 
24 Omitted month for colinearity issues is month2 (February 1945); month3 (March 1945), month6 (September 
1945), month8 (December 1945), month27 (June 1949) are not significant; month4 (May 1945), month5 (July 1945) 
and month10 (April 1946) are significant at the 5%-level; all other months are significant at the 1%-level.  
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